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It seems so clear, so clearly obvious: we are living in times of crisis: global health crisis (Covid-
19), environmental crisis (the fires), socio-economic crisis (intensifying inequalities), political 
crisis (the autocrats). These layers of crisis, protracted crisis – this is what we name ‘times of 
crisis’. Amin Samman takes up this condition of our times. His focus is on what he calls 
“financial times” and his main concern is to illustrate how “we imagine and produce history in 
financial times” (Samman, 2019: ix).
Rather than merely accepting that financial crises are the result of market failures and 
insufficient regulation, Samman explores how the language of economics and the economic 
imagination are the products of simplistic, linear conceptions of time so as to consider the 
ways that a particular historiography of finance, as a history of crises, is produced. In that 
sense, his book is an inquiry into what he calls “the logics of financial history” (vii) as told 
through crises. Our financial times are constituted by eternal return – what Samman describes 
as feedback loops that shape and even overdetermine narration and the financial 
imagination. 
This point is perhaps most clear today: analysts around the globe are currently debating 
the ongoing crisis. They ask whether various national economies are in a temporary phase of 
economic recession or in a more lasting phase of economic depression, induced by the 
lockdown response to the Covid-19 pandemic. As Samman notes, and as is evident in the case 
of these contemporary debates, “return and recurrence” (the title of Chapter Three) is enacted 
through reference to the Great Depression as a limit event in the narration of financial crisis. 
The Great Depression is a term that serves epochal recurrence, or the marking of historical 
time as times of crisis. Samman maintains, as many philosophers of history have before him, 
that modes of temporal experience have a foundational relationship to practices of 
historiography. And while we might pause to ask whether ‘temporal experience’ refers to the 
experience of space-time or quantum time or ancestral time, or some other rendition of time, 
Samman is specifically concerned with the narration of finance and financial history. As he 
says, “Today, a chronological conception of time serves as the bedrock principle for any self-
consciously historical form of economics” (4). Thus, “the past circulates within the present as 
Finance and Society
2020, 6(2): 136-40
© The Author(s)
10.2218/finsoc.v6i2.5273
Forum
137 Finance and Society 6(2) 
an evolving repertoire of abstract patterns – names, concepts, archetypes and so on…” (5). In 
other words, the Great Depression gives form to the economics of the global pandemic. And 
the Great Depression is more than a historical legacy; as a limit concept, it is a vector of the 
historical imagination that serves to organize temporal experience and narration.
As an inquiry into ‘the logics of financial history’, as told through – or constituted by – 
crisis, Amin Samman posits crisis as history. This is an account of claims about ‘finance’: 
narratives and discourses about finance, the production of financial truths and financial 
history. The book also raises questions related to the philosophy of history. At times, Samman 
posits crisis as an event that obtains and is of an epistemological order: with the closing of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, “…our certainties were rocked” (2). And this moment, 
which Samman takes to be a founding event, leads him to conclude: “The crisis that followed 
struck a mortal blow to the manifest destiny of liberal finance, replacing a seemingly self-
evident assertion – ‘we live in financial times’ – with a series of searching questions about the 
evolution of financial markets, their recurring bouts of instability, and the challenges these 
pose to existing modes of financial governance” (3). We might ask: Has liberal finance been 
mortally struck down? And, if the assertion that ‘we live in financial times’ has been replaced, 
what has emerged in its stead? Indeed, Samman himself illustrates how the proposition 
‘financial times’ partakes in a philosophy of history, which indicates that we first have to 
consider how and why Lehman Brothers is taken to be a founding event. How does its closing 
stand for the end of certainties regarding financial practice and financial history? Many other 
indices could have been given the status of ‘a financial event’ and ‘financial crisis’, because 
the subprime mortgage market and associated secondary markets were always already 
undercapitalized. The question is: Does Samman take the Lehman Brothers collapse as a 
moment of epistemological rupture that transformed financial knowledge practices? Or does 
he take it to be a product of narrative logics and even a philosophy of history?
This question of knowledge practices is addressed early in the text; and Samman makes 
the case for the relationship between a philosophy of history and the relative power of 
particular knowledge practices. By taking up Wendy Brown’s (2015) point that homo 
economicus has triumphed over homo politicus, he raises the Foucaultian question of the 
ways that historical knowledge gives rise to subject positions and particular modes of 
governing (8). Samman doesn’t question Brown’s odd assumption of distinctions between the 
political, religious, ethical, moral, tribal, and so on. (Aren’t these categories mutually 
constituted and therefore always co-present? Aren’t all economic concepts wrought from 
assumptions and precepts that are of the political-religious-ethical-moral order?). But he does 
query the assumed boundaries of homo economicus and homo politicus, and argues in favor 
of homo historia, taken from Deleuze and Guattari, so as to consider the “vast body of 
knowledge and techniques that [have] been built up around the idea of history, taking shape 
alongside those associated with the idea of economy” (8). His important point is that historical 
reason is part and parcel of economic reason. As he says, “…there is a sense in which the 
narrative logic of historical reason works away at the margins or in the background of other 
discourses, providing a sense of antecedent, trajectory, and possibility that would otherwise be 
missing from a purely economic or financial perspective” (9). In other words, there is no purely 
economic or financial perspective. No homo economicus to push homo politicus out of the 
way. Samman goes on to maintain that historical reason “persists despite the apparent 
economization of everything” (9). Or can we say that historical reason persists because of the 
apparent economization of everything? These are slightly different propositions. The latter 
gives full force to Samman’s point about a philosophy of history and the concomitant 
production of economic knowledge.
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In a helpful manner, Samman posits historical reason as the site of knowledge production 
(producing the very distinctions between ‘economic’, ‘political’, ‘religious’, for example). And 
yet at times we encounter versions of positivism: “To describe contemporary capitalism as 
financial is to suggest an epochal shift in relations between finance and other spheres of 
economic activity” (11). As with the Lehman Brothers example, we wonder whether Samman is 
asserting that this epochal shift actually obtained (there are historical epochs, such as that of 
finance capitalism) or that ‘epoch’ is a category of historical reason, which gives rise to 
qualifications of human activity, such as ‘finance capitalism’. Following Peter Osborne (1995), 
Samman notes that these structural categories of historical analysis are inherent to practices 
of periodization, which are ‘totalizing’ and, we might add, fundamentally political (as argued by 
Said, 1979; Fabian, 1983; Asad, 2003; Davis, 2008). And this is equally true of the concept of 
crisis, a structural category of historical analysis, or means of positing and knowing history 
(Roitman, 2014). If, as Samman claims, crisis is a category of historical reason, then was the 
closing of Lehman Brothers a moment of crisis? And what, then, is the status of the habitual 
epochs of economic historiography: agricultural capitalism, industrial capitalism, finance 
capitalism?
Answers to these questions would ideally be informed by addressing the problem of 
distinctions noted above: economic, financial, social, political, cultural, religious, moral, 
etcetera. How do we produce these distinctions? Amin Samman quite rightly flags the issue of 
positing finance as an autonomous sphere or realm of knowledge and practice. He critiques 
claims that financialization is “escaping the order of history” (14), becoming an abstract place 
of hegemonic thought and a vector of alienation. The claim that financial markets are 
increasingly ‘disembedded’ from seemingly more fundamental or real domains of activity is 
nonsensical and illogical, as anthropologists and those associated with the New Economic 
Sociology and the Social Studies of Finance have long argued. This is because financial 
institutions and financial practices are profoundly material; they are not abstract, ahistorical 
realms of practice (What would an ahistorical realm of practice even look like?). And, as 
important, if embeddedness signifies emerging from or being steeped in social relations, well, 
then all institutions and practices are embedded. But then why does Samman, who reiterates 
these important points, seek to explain how different modes of history production – historical 
narratives and key terms such as The Great Depression – are embedded in financial 
discourse? (15-16). As he writes, “Crises do not simply exist; they must be collectively 
imagined into existence” (41). In other words, crisis is an object of knowledge. “But,” Samman 
adds, “in order for a crisis to be properly historical (rather than legal, medical, or religious), 
these stories have to be routed through the historical record” (41). Aren’t medical crises also 
historical? That is, they are deemed medical crises (a pandemic) when they are constructed or 
circumscribed as ‘events’, or as even counting as ‘historical’. Can we say that there is religious 
crisis (a personal existential crisis) that is not historical (religious warfare), that is not inscribed 
in the annals of history? Perhaps. But the fact that a personal existential crisis can even be 
qualified as ‘religious’ is an example of an effective philosophy of history (religion as a 
category of history and a locus of truth).
This question of the status of crisis in history and the status of crisis as a historical 
concept is shared by both Amin Samman and myself. Though he sees my inquiry into the 
concept of crisis as an enabling blind spot as distinct from his inquiry into the metahistorical 
significance of the term, we are partners in crime insofar as we both seek to show how the 
concept is mobilized to generate “competing figurations of economic and financial 
history” (22). We share the view that, in his words, “Crises are imagined as events that agents 
themselves take to be turning points within history” (23). This is what I take to be the 
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anthropology of the concept of crisis (Roitman, 2014: 1-14). An approach in terms of an 
anthropology of the concept isn’t so much concerned with the adequacy of crisis for critique, 
as Samman claims. Instead, it is intended to illustrate how, for academic scholars, crisis is 
posited as an unexamined modality of critique. Crisis is posited, critique ensues. And, in true 
anthropological fashion, it also aims to illustrate how crisis is practiced as a concept more 
generally, giving rise to critique, historiography, truth claims, and socio-economic inequalities 
or power differentials. In that sense, one cannot advocate that we should (or could) do away 
with the concept of crisis, as Samman, like others, has portrayed my position (111). While that 
would be a form of utopia, it is also a naïve position that assumes the possibility of a 
voluntaristic transformation of epistemology. 
History in Financial Times sheds light on the historiography of contemporary finance. 
Through a series of original illustrations, Samman tracks the constitutive terms of crisis 
narratives and, following Régis Debray, he indicates the ways in which accounts of crisis feed 
into the very process they purport to explain. There is a tension in the book that is inescapable: 
between the production of crisis historiography, on the one hand, and the practice of the 
concept of crisis, on the other. There is, in other words, a barely articulated distinction 
between crisis as a “metahistorical force” and crisis as a “peculiar, naturalist” category (28). 
This inescapable tension runs through my own work as well. And this is, in my view, what 
justifies an anthropological approach, the goal of which is to apprehend historiography (e.g. 
Koselleck, political economists) as entailing the practice of the concept of crisis, and to 
apprehend the ways that agents (e.g. financial actors, Lehman Brothers employees) in the 
world practice the concept of crisis. Both involve the practice of the concept; it is only a 
metahistorical concept insofar as it allows one to posit ‘History’ and in that sense partakes of 
a philosophy of history.
As Samman argues, there is academic crisis theory and there is crisis thinking in the 
world. But when we say that ‘agents themselves’ take crisis to be a turning point in history – 
that is, there is effective crisis for people – is this a generalized truth claim? Which agents? All 
agents? Did people who worked for Lehman Brothers in 2008 take the subprime mortgage 
crisis to be a turning point in history? That is an empirical question. And even if we grant that 
all agents at Lehman Brothers did this, are situations of subjective indeterminacy (as defined 
by ‘the new crisis theory’) experienced and understood in the same way by all? If structural 
change is to arise from situations of subjective indeterminacy, then we need to understand 
how different financial agents engender one-and-the-same understanding of effective history. 
Finance is a heterogeneous terrain (investment banks, asset management firms, pension 
funds, stock markets, bond markets, capital markets, consumer credit markets, sovereign 
wealth funds, central banks, regulatory agencies) and the operations of finance are 
heterogeneous too (pricing, trading, hedging, intermediation, accounting, computation, 
automation, modeling, and so on). A meta-narrative of crisis-as-turning-point-in-history might 
emerge from this vast realm, but then how do we substantiate that this meta-narrative has 
generated structural change? When Lehman Brothers closed, what structural change ensued?
Amin Samman shows us that ‘crisis thinking’ cannot be assumed; it is the result of a 
particular historiography and philosophy of history. This should give us pause so as to consider 
the distinction between a diffusionist history of crisis, or an account based on the spread and 
circulation of terms that substantiate crisis narratives, on the one hand, and an 
epistemological approach to crisis, or an account of the concept of crisis as an object of 
knowledge, on the other. The title of the book, History in Financial Times, is evocative and 
indicates that what is at stake is History. Samman illustrates that point with reference to 
narrative and discourse. The title signifies that contemporary historiography is constituted by 
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financial times, or the temporal modalities of finance. We might add that the latter – the 
temporal modalities of finance – are as much material as they are discursive. In that sense, an 
appreciation of how we have come to know our contemporary world as ‘Financial Times’ 
requires knowledge of narrative and discourse as much as knowledge of practices. Amin 
Samman tells us that we are in financial times because we produce history as ‘financial 
times’. This is a very welcome contribution to the question of how we produce history as 
financial crisis.
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